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 TAMPA'S LONGEST DAY 
Now It Can Be Told: The National Guard’s 
Official Report on City Election, Sept. 3, 1935 
 
By HAMPTON DUNN 
 
 
Tampa has just gone through another 
quadrennial Mayoralty election. This one was 
a mild, patty-cake affair, compared with many 
we had back in the pre-World War 11 days. 
 
The hottest election of ’em all occurred on 
Tuesday, Sept. 3, 1935, following a turbulent 
Labor Day weekend and during one, of the 
city’s most violent tropical storms. 
 
And a "hot" election in that era meant just that 
- "hot" votes, fraudulent registrations, stolen 
ballot boxes, cannon manned by National 
Guard troops, reckless display of machine 
guns, sawed-off shotguns and a whole arsenal 
THE MORNING AFTER 
This was the front page of the Tampa Morning Tribune the morning after the hectic City election of Sept. 3, 1935. 
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of weapons by an army of special City Police 
and special Sheriff’s deputies. 
 
Showdown Clash 
 
This was the showdown clash between two 
political factions. The two camps were headed 
by old pros-then incumbent Robert E. Lee 
Chancey and Ex-Mayor D. B. McKay. There 
had been a "warmup" contest four years 
before, and tensions and bad feelings had 
continued to build up as the battle for power 
raged onward. 
 
Election Day 1935-44 years ago-brought an 
eyeball to eyeball confrontation of the City 
and County adversaries. And it was a day in 
which there was a display of naked, brute 
force. All of which gave Tampa a bad name 
throughout the nation. 
 
It was the infamous day in history when this 
city hit rock bottom. There was very little 
good about those "good old days. " 
 
Besides the Mayoralty candidates, the two top 
characters in the day’s events were 
Hillsborough County Sheriff Will C. Spencer 
and Police Chief R. G. Tittsworth. 
 
Troops Turned Out 
 
And Gov. David Sholtz and State Adjutant 
General Vivian Collins ordered out the 
National Guard to keep order. Col. Homer W. 
Hesterly was Commanding Officer of the 
116th Field Artillery, with headquarters in 
Tampa. 
 
(By the way: When it was all over and the 
smoke of battle had cleared and the winds of 
the storm had calmed and the National Guard 
troops went back to being civilians, it was 
determined that Mayor Chancey had been 
reelected by a margin of 4,241 votes. 
 
(The mess triggered a cleanup movement by 
the good citizens of the community.) 
 
Here, for the first time, is published the 
official narrative of the day’s happenings, as 
recorded by Colonel Hesterly in his report to 
General Collins. He wrote the report in the 
same calm, cool and firm way, in which he 
directed the troops during that crisis. The 
report was made available to me by today’s 
State Adjutant General, Maj.-Gen. K. C. 
Bullard, whose headquarters is in St. 
Augustine. General Bullard is a former 
Tampan and served as Hillsborough County 
Tax Collector prior to his appointment to the 
Florida National Guard’s highest position. He’s 
an alumnus of the 16th FA. 
 
Colonel Hesterly’s Report 
 
On with the story: 
 
HEADQUARTERS 
COL. HOMER W. HESTERLY 
‘... you kept your feet on the ground.' 
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116TH FIELD ARTILLERY 
FLORIDA NATIONAL GUARD 
 
                                    TAMPA, FLORIDA 
October 5, 1935. 
 
SUBJECT: Report of Active State Duty. 
 
TO: The Adjutant General, State of Florida, 
State Arsenal, Saint Augustine, Florida. 
 
1. The following report covering the activities 
of troops called into active state duty by letter 
of the Adjutant General, Florida, dated 
September 3, 1935, later confirmed by 
paragraphs I and 2, Special Orders No. 209, 
AGO. Florida, September 5, 1935, is 
submitted: 
 
2. Threatened disorders in 
connection with the municipal 
election of the city of Tampa 
caused considerable alarm among 
citizens and officials, resulting in 
the sheriff of Hillsborough County 
calling on the Governor for the 
assistance of the National Guard. 
The need for troops was 
announced by the sheriff several 
days in advance of the election and 
the Adjutant General reached 
Tampa the evening of 31 Aug. ’35, 
to observe the situation and report 
to the Governor as to the true state 
of affairs. 
 
3. Threats of disorder, inter-factional strife, 
fraudulent election practices, ballot box 
stuffing, stealing and switching; 
dissatisfaction on the part of many citizens 
with the activities of the election officials; 
rumored importation of hundreds of outside 
gunmen as special officers, and many other 
more subtle influences portended a trying day 
for September 3, election day. The Adjutant 
General conferred with many officials, 
candidates, and citizens, besides the 
Governor’s office; and, on September 2nd, the 
order was issued for the mobilization of the 
Tampa units of the National Guard to be held 
in readiness at the Armory in Benjamin Field 
for use in emergency, especially to quell 
disorders. 
 
GOV. DAVID SHOLTZ 
’I Am Proud . . . " 
-STATE PHOTOGRAPHIC ARCHIVES
4. The Guard was called to aid the "civil 
authority", and a very interesting and, at times, 
confusing situation arose in this connection. 
There appeared to be, (and formal legal 
opinion of attorneys conflicted on the point), 
two overlapping bodies in power. The 
"Election Board" of the City of Tampa is a 
duly constituted body empowered by a special 
act of the state legislature to conduct 
municipal elections and said act attempted to 
give full power to act, including the policing 
of the elections. This police power in fact, if 
not at law, overlaps the power of the sheriff, 
the superior constitutional officer of the 
county to enforce the law and maintain order. 
The election board called on the city police 
department under the chief of police, to 
furnish the "police power" of the board. This 
apparent overlapping of authority to police the 
polls was the root of the trouble, which 
resulted in the calling of the Guard. This 
report takes no part of or interest in the 
under-lying causes of this condition, nor the 
other conditions which affected the participa-
tion of the Guard in the operations of the day. 
The remarks immediately following are purely 
expository and are set forth for the 
information of the Guard and for its assistance 
in possible subsequent similar developments. 
Further, these facts are generally known to the 
townspeople who are prone to shut their eyes 
to the conditions, and hence the remarks 
herein are merely expression of what is 
common knowledge and not the expression of 
any partisan party. The Guard must oftentimes 
step into a situation where the real issue is 
beclouded by conditions, and this makes its 
position the most difficult and its activities 
fraught with greater possibility of subsequent 
adverse publicity and criticism- oftentimes by 
the ones it is faithfully undertaking to serve. 
 
6. Be the underlying factors what they 
may: the election board, armed by 
the chief of police and his force, 
augmented by about 1154 special 
police imported into the city for the 
day, were interested in seeing that the 
conduct of the election was in 
accordance with the dictates of the 
election board, and they were ob-
viously supporting one group of 
candidates. The sheriff’s department, 
on the other hand, with an estimated 
five hundred special deputies likewise 
deputized for the day, was supporting 
the other interests, and hence was 
opposed to the city police force. 
Ostensibly, the sheriff’s men were to 
prevent irregularities in the election, 
which, it was claimed, the underlings 
of the election officials were in-
terested in perpetrating in favor of 
their candidate. This appeared to be 
essentially the situation, and this is 
the problem the Guard confronted. 
Doubtless affidavits in any number 
could be secured, defending both 
sides. However, conflicting the 
factors, the Guard had its work cut 
out for it. 
 
7. So the order read "called out in aid of the 
civil authority": this is, or course, the sheriff. 
The sheriff’s office was accusing the election 
officials of every degree and brand of 
irregularity and undertook to take steps to stop 
or prevent these irregularities. The Guard was 
called on to perform many duties which are 
not within the province of the Guard under 
existing orders; and careful consideration of 
the many and varied demands made on the 
military, was given, to determine just how far 
the force of the State could be utilized. 
Generally the Guard furnished the force while 
the sheriff’s deputies armed with warrants 
made arrests under the muzzles of the rifles 
and pistols of the military. The Guard declined 
to make arrests, take or hold prisoners, enter 
polling places, handle election paraphernalia, 
to vote in uniform, to police polling places 
(the duty of the election officials), or, of 
course, to take orders from any but proper 
military sources or from the sheriff direct. It is 
interesting to note that throughout the day a 
constant stream of demands, some right 
fantastic, came pouring into military 
headquarters, compliance with which would 
have been impossible in some cases, and in 
others would have been entirely unsound from 
a tactical standpoint and which would have 
reduced the effectiveness of the armed forces 
to the vanishing point. 
 
8. The Adjutant General issued general 
instructions while the details of operation 
were, properly, left entirely up to the troops 
commander, and it can be stated that the 
troops commander received the fullest support 
from the Adjutant General. 
 
9. It is obvious from the foregoing that 
the military establishment were 
confronted with a very unusual 
situation. There was no mob, no 
rioting body, no threatened invasion, 
no anarchistic demonstration. 
Strange as it may seem, the National 
Guard found itself supporting one 
political body against another, both 
ostensibly properly constituted and 
duly empowered each to perform the 
same job, but on opposite sides of 
the political fence. Its job included 
preserving order, and this involved 
protecting the public from 
irresponsibles enlisted in either or 
both factions; it involved supporting 
the sheriff in making raids on 
establishments where persons were 
on whom warrants for arrest had 
been issued; and this included a 
number of precincts where the 
precinct officials at the tables were 
put under arrest. In some instances, 
petty officials of the city were 
involved. On top of that, the military 
found later in the day that it would 
have to decline to assist in certain 
operations which, it was felt, fell 
without the jurisdiction of National 
Guard activity under its general 
instruction. 
 
10. It became apparent that there was a very 
conflicting situation. It should be stated that 
the actual conduct of the election was in no 
sense within the scope of the military 
operations. What went on around the polls 
under authority of the election board and their 
properly appointed officials, was not the 
business of the Guard, and only when called 
on by the sheriff to support his men in some 
operation, raid, or arrest, did the Guard take a 
hand itself. Many false rumors about 
guardsmen "taking ballot boxes" and "entering 
polling places with machine guns", etc., were 
circulated. Orders on this class of activities 
were clearcut and definite and well observed. 
 
OPERATIONS. 
 
11. The tactical employment of troops can be 
definitely classified in several phases as the 
day developed: 
 
1. Day before election. Mobilization at 
8:30 P.M. 2 Sept. ’35. 
2. Prior to 9:00 A.M. Command held in 
readiness at Armory 3 Sept. ’35. 
3. 9:00 A.M. to 2:00 P.M. 
Reconnaissance and patrols. 3 Sept. ’35. 
4. 2:00 P.M. 3 Sept. to 2:30 A.M. 4 Sept. 
’35. 
a. Strategical dispositions of force and 
b. Support of sheriff’s deputies in raids 
and arrests. 
 
MOBILIZATION. 
 
12. The order for mobilization was broadcast 
from Station WDAE at 6:00 P.M. and 
repeated at subsequent times. The customary 
telephone system of spreading word was used 
as well. By 8:30, the hour of mobilization, 
approximately 60 percent of the command 
was on the field in uniform. By midnight 
approximately 90 percent were present for 
duty. The strength for duty on September 3, 
election day, for the post was as follows: 
 
Strength Report, September 3, 1935 
Organization: OFFICERS E M AGGEGATE 
                Strength  Present    Strength Present          Strength Present 
Regtl staff      6 5 0 0 6 5 
Staff   1st Bn 4 3 0 0 4 3 
He. Bury & C in 1st Bn 
                      3 3 36 34 39 37 
Battery "A”   4 3 67 64 71 67 
Battery "B”   4 4 68 62 72 66 
Battery "C"   4 4 65 60 69 64 
Med Dept Det 
       .3 3 22 22 25 25 
Attached    2 2 1 1 3 3 
 30 27 259 243 289          270 
            
 
 
 
ELECTION DAY OPERATIONS 
 
13. An intelligence section in civilian clothes 
began operation as soon as the order for 
mobilization was given, and continued to 
gather information and report it to the troops 
commander until the troops were dismissed. 
Prior to 9:00 A.M. Force in readiness. 
a. Contrary to the special formations planned 
for regular riot duty the batteries were held 
intact, and were formed into squads within the 
battery in accordance with the riot duty 
formations, consisting of  
Rifle squad, 
Strong arm squad,  
Machine gun squad (1 section) 
each in command of an officer, the 
captain commanding. 
 
b. Gas detail from all batteries armed with 
special equipment from state arsenal, was 
assembled into on gas squad under a 
lieutenant. This detail was held at the Armory 
throughout the day ready for emergency 
service in any part of the city. 
 
Equipment consisted of three gas guns with 
gas shells, gas grenades, gas masks, pistols. 
 
c. Regimental Commander was in command. 
 
d. Regimental staff formed into observation 
patrols ready to move out on reconnaissance 
as soon as need for troops should be in 
prospect. The order "in readiness" required 
holding troops at the Armory. 
 
e. One officer, properly selected for 
coolheadedness and understanding of law, was 
placed in the sheriff’s office as coordinator 
between the sheriff’s office and troops head-
quarters with special duties of securing from 
the sheriff his instructions; and, for the 
protection of the Guard, he secured, when 
deemed advisable, signed orders covering the 
demands of the sheriff. 
 
14. 9:00 A.M. to 2:00 P.M., September 3: 
During the forenoon and through noon, and 
after the order to take active part in the 
support of the sheriff was received, the 
dispositions were made with a view of 
establishing contact patrols of negligible force 
and of officers of sufficient experience to 
prevent unwarranted, alarming reports and 
preclude too hasty action in participating in 
the anticipated disturbance. The regimental 
executive was assigned a portion of the city, 
the regimental plans and training officer a 
portion, and the battalion commander with a 
small force was dispatched to certain critical 
points, such as particularly unruly precincts. 
These patrols reported by phone at thirty 
minute intervals, giving Headquarters and the 
Regimental Commander a clear picture of the 
situation and the sentiment as the election 
wore on. 
 
This set-up afforded several important 
accomplishments: 
a. Regimental Headquarters was 
constantly advised of the situation 
throughout the city as every polling 
place was covered. 
b. The presence of officers at the 
precincts, in succession, had a very 
quieting effect. It did not stop the ir-
regularities of the election 
organizations but it dampened the 
ardor of the irregulars, some of whom 
were underworld characters and 
ex-lawbreakers under arms on both 
sides. 
c. It afforded an excellent opportunity 
to develop clearly a plan of action 
when the troops were compelled to 
take more definite action. 
 
16. During this period, the sheriff 
made no particular demands calling 
for participation of the troops in any 
workable tactical plan. He did insist 
on having the troops parcelled out by 
details to each precinct, 29 of 
them-"to stop repeating and prevent 
officials from stuffing ballot boxes" 
and perform the duties of deputies. 
This the commanding officer stead-
fastly declined to do. The correctness 
of his decision in denying this 
subdivision of his force was justified 
in tactics, and particularly, in 
subsequent developments. It is felt 
important to stress the insistence 
which the sheriff used in demanding 
this division of force, and the 
responsibility the commanding officer 
necessarily took upon himself in 
declining the request of his proper 
source of orders, the sheriff. The 
commander of troops necessarily 
assumes that responsibility; he takes 
the position that the sheriff could 
request him to support the deputies, 
but the method to be used is for the 
troops commander to decide. 
 
 
The troops participating in this phase was 
important, though not conspicuous. 
 
17. 2:00 P.M., September 3 to 12:30 A.M., 
September 4: During the afternoon and night, 
the principal activities of the troops took 
place. As a matter of fact, the entire force, 
except a small reserve, was out about the city 
throughout the afternoon and right through the 
worst of the hurricane. The operations in 
general consisted in: 
 
a. Strategical and tactical dispositions. 
b. Active support of raids and arrests 
by sheriff’s 
 deputies. 
c. Guarding of polling places to 
prevent disorders and irregularities 
such as stealing, or     switching, of 
ballot boxes. 
FORT HONORS HESTERLY 
A WPA project in the late 1930s provided Tampa with 
a first class military armory. It was named Fort Homer 
W. Hesterly, commanding officer of the 116th Field 
Artillery. He was in charge of troops, then operating 
out of old Benjamin Field during that hot City election 
in 1935. 
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 It is notable that support was given the sheriff 
in effecting several raids in which warrants for 
the arrest of the precinct officials were served 
and the officials removed from the polling 
place; in three instances the deputies took the 
ballot boxes also-as evidence. The election 
officials complained bitterly about the 
removal of the ballot boxes and in subsequent 
raids the troops were compelled to prevent the 
sheriff from taking the ballot boxes without a 
court order, which, after investigation, was 
decided by legal counsel to be necessary 
before the Guard could properly assist the 
sheriff in such an act. One of the most critical 
situations of the day occurred at one precinct 
where the deputies demanded the box as well 
as the arrest of the officials, and when it was 
refused, a very tense situation arose, near 
midnight, into which the Guard stepped to 
very good effect; the deputies got their 
officials and the election board retained their 
ballot box. 
 
18. In any of the raids pulled resulting in 
the arrest of the officials, the Guard 
took no active part in the service of the 
warrants leaving that entirely for the 
deputies to do. The troops did not enter 
a polling place, take any prisoners, or 
interfere in any way with the legal pro-
cedure of the election. Without 
exception, they merely supplied the 
display of force under which the 
deputies performed their duties. 
 
19. The manner of performing the raids was 
conventional. The troops would move into 
position surrounding the object of the raid; 
machine guns mounted on antiaircraft tripods 
were set up in trucks and were stationed at 
strategic points covering the windows and 
openings of the establishment. Foot troops, 
armed with rifle and bayonet and pistol and. 
riot sticks, accompanied the deputies as 
 
closely as deemed necessary, to give them 
ample and certain protection. The deputies 
entered the places and made the arrests, after 
which the troops commander might detail an 
armed convoy to accompany the deputies and 
prisoners to the jail. The machine guns on 
antiaircraft tripods are not particularly well 
adapted to this service, in so far as the security 
of the gun squad is concerned, as snipers 
could very easily cripple the crew. The moral 
effect, however, was most excellent. The 
ability to sweep the surrounding area with fire 
in all directions, to cover windows an 
housetops against snipers-and, too, the very 
daring of so mounting the guns, had a very 
salutary effect. 
 
All raids involving arrests were conducted in 
essentially this manner. 
 
20. The gas detachment was held at the 
armory in reserve for an emergency where it 
might be necessary to empty a building or 
break up a concerted disturbance between the 
henchmen of the two hostile factions. In the 
disturbance at midnight, above referred to, it 
appeared for some time as if the troops would 
have to force an entrance to the polling place, 
to assist the deputies in making arrests. In this 
case the gas detail was dispatched there to 
neutralize the force of some hundred-odd 
special police housed in the polling place for 
the purpose of repelling the attack of the 
deputies. Strict orders had been issued by the 
chief of police to allow no one to take the 
ballot box at any cost. The Guard succeeded in 
gaining the arrest of officials by the deputies, 
and at the same time preserved the box for the 
police, not having any authority from the court 
to take the box. 
 
21. At about three o’clock in the 
afternoon of September 3, it had 
become evident there 
would be armed participation by the 
majority of the troops. This was 
particularly true in light of the fact 
that we were to aid the sheriff in his 
raids and arrests. It was impossible to 
foretell what the reaction among the 
large force of special police might be. 
Hence it was decided to make a 
strategic move and threaten the 
"centers" of greatest tension and ir-
regularity. These were on opposite 
sides of the city but on the same 
through street and scarcely more than 
a mile apart. However, it made a very 
nice disposition, together with the 
other battery being used in a 
succession of raids. A battery was 
detailed to each of these points with 
orders to make a show of force in the 
vicinity of these particular polling 
places; to report to the principal 
deputy on duty, assist him in any 
reasonable demands, locate im-
mediately a telephone and contact 
troops headquarters, leaving on duty 
two men at the phone, and await 
developments and orders. 
 
22. It developed that the presence of these two 
forces so advantageously disposed, also had a 
very dampening effect on the irregulars of the 
police department, and tended to calm the 
situation over a wide territory. 
 
23. Threats of impending clashes in other 
sections and at troublesome precincts caused a 
further disposition of force to cover closely a 
wide territory. The two battery commanders 
were directed to dispatch a fourth of their bat-
teries to two additional precincts, each in 
command of an officer with instructions to 
immediately report to headquarters by phone, 
establishing contact and detailing two men to 
remain at the phone (telephone men and, of 
course, a messenger); to report to the principal 
deputy and assist him in any reasonable 
mission, and keep in close telephone contact 
with his battery commander. 
 
24. We now had these several units in the field 
in close communication: 
a. One battery assisting deputies in a 
succession of 
 raids. 
b. Two batteries, less detachments, 
covering “centers" of unrest. 
c. Four platoon detachments stationed 
at as many precincts and in close 
communication with their battery 
commanders. 
d. Roving officer patrol observing and 
reporting on 
 the territory not otherwise covered. 
e. A reserve and a gas squad at the 
Armory. 
f. Command post and message center 
at Headquarters (Armory). 
g. Liaison officer in the sheriff's office. 
h. The Adjutant General at his hotel in 
touch with the State and leaders of 
both factions, with the press and 
public. 
 
An organization chart as in force, is appended 
showing the dispositions and chain of 
command during the afternoon's activities. 
 
25. A most notable feature is the extreme 
mobility of the command with the trucks. The 
batteries used their own equipment, which was 
ample. The patrolling was done in 
headquarters station wagons. No effort was 
made to be secretive and boldness was the 
custom. In a very few minutes' time, a battery 
could be dispatched from one precinct to 
another and, while the officer in command 
was perfecting dispositions, a detail was 
contacting head quarters and a new phone 
number was noted on the diagrams at 
headquarters. It was understood that instantly 
a phone went out another would be resorted 
to. In this man ner, a comparatively small 
force covered a wide territory to the 
discomfiture, it is safe to say, of the irregulars 
who were causing such disturbance as went 
on. 
 
26. During the tour of duty a complete 
message center was in operation at the 
Armory. With our own equipment the 
phone from the boxing arena was run 
into the headquarters; the instrument 
from the officer’s club was cut in on the 
regular phone as an extension; and the 
interphone system on the post made con-
tact with the outside phone from 
Regimental Headquarters. The 
operations of the day were conducted in 
an improvised office on the ground floor 
where there was ample space for the 
organization to operate without 
disturbing the regular headquarters of 
the post. The message center made a 
record of all incoming and outgoing 
messages, particularly orders directing 
troop movements, and a chart was kept 
showing the pecinct number, 
detachment, officer in command, and 
telephone number at all times. This was, 
of course, changed as the day wore on 
and orders were issued moving forces. 
 
27. A map of the city was placed on a plane 
table and pins with appropriate tickets showed 
the dispositions at a glance. 
 
One command telephone line was restricted to 
the use o the Executive in receiving orders 
from the sheriff’s office and in issuing orders 
and contacting the moving forces This line 
had an extension from the message center with 
an instrument on the Executive’s desk so that 
he could hear al incoming messages and so the 
Sergeant Major could get without loss of time, 
outgoing messages and record them in the 
diary. 
 
28. During the hours when it was in operation 
in the heat of the activity of the afternoon and 
early evening, the organization worked to 
perfection; and one would have thought it had 
been in operation indefinitely. Late in the day, 
however, the telephones began to fail, and in 
the midst of the storm the operations were 
transferred to Post Headquarters where a 
phone was still in operation. Fortunately, this 
phone held on until 11:00 P.M. where all 
phone communication went on. The midnight 
operation above noted was handled through 
couriers. 
 
29. Coupled with the high mobility, the 
morale and spirit of the men was superb. Not 
only was the attendance phenomenal, but the 
willingness of the command, officer and man 
alike, to fare forth on this most uncomfortable 
mission, facing criticism and discomfort as 
well as the unbated fury of the tropical 
hurricane, not to mention some hazard before 
hundreds of unorganized and undisciplined 
gunmen was a display that the Florida 
National Guard may well be proud of and 
upon which the State of Florida may rest with 
full assurance of unquestioned and unflinching 
service from her soldiers, in any emergency. 
 
30. It is noteworthy that, after the troops took 
active part in the operations of the day,  not a 
report of disturbance was recorded. Credit 
must be given in this for the advent of the 
terrific storm, which very effectively cooled 
the ardor of the participants which, otherwise, 
might have led to hilarity and trouble; and for 
the fact that special police officers had been 
instructed that the orders of the military force 
were supreme. 
 
31. Although there has been criticism from all 
sides, it seems to be generally conceded that 
the National Guard acquitted itself with 
distinction. To use the words of Governor 
Sholtz to the troop commander: "You men did 
a good job, you kept your feet on the ground, I 
am proud of your regiment". 
 
(Signed) HOMER W. HESTERLY 
Homer W. Hesterly, 
Colonel, 116th Field Artillery, 
Commanding. 
 
 
 
A TRUE COPY 
 
VIVIAN COLLINS, The Adjutant General, Florida. 
 
 
